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In the late 1990s the Dynamic Capabilities framework by Teece et al. (1997) shifted the focus 
of strategic management to an individual company’s resources and its ability to adapt them to 
external market trends. Refined by Barreto (2010), this resource-based view serves as a 
theoretical framework for this thesis, which aims at examining the development of a strategic, 
technological partnership between two established industrial companies.  
Hereby, Daimler and BMW, two of Germany’s leading automotive manufacturers are used as 
a real-world example in the form of a case study. The case depicts the current developments in 
the automotive industry and the opportunities available in the field of new mobility for 
traditional manufacturing companies. It outlines Daimler’s and BMW’s historical milestones 
and their path towards their mobility joint venture YourNow, launched in early 2019.  
From a strategic point of view, the case highlights the companies’ motives for the joint venture. 
It analyzes the exogenous shocks the companies faced, urging the former rivals to cooperate. 
Furthermore, the case evaluates the joint venture’s capabilities to succeed in the highly 
competitive mobility market as of mid 2020.   
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No final dos anos 1990, a framework das Dynamic Capabilities de Teece et al. (1997) mudou 
o foco da gestão estratégica para os recursos internos de uma empresa e para a sua capacidade 
de adaptá-los às tendências do mercado externo. Refinada por Barreto (2010), essa visão 
baseada em recursos serve como base teórica para esta tese, que visa examinar o 
desenvolvimento de uma parceria tecnológica estratégica entre duas empresas industriais já 
estabelecidas no mercado. 
O caso de estudo da Daimler e da BMW, dois dos principais fabricantes de automóveis da 
Alemanha, é utilizado como exemplo do mundo real das empresas. O caso descreve os 
desenvolvimentos atuais na indústria automóvel e as oportunidades disponíveis no campo da 
nova mobilidade para os fabricantes tradicionais. São relatados os marcos históricos da Daimler 
e da BMW e o seu caminho para a joint venture de mobilidade “YourNow”, lançada no início 
de 2019. 
Do ponto de vista estratégico, o caso destaca os motivos das empresas para a joint venture. 
Analisa ainda os choques exógenos enfrentados pelas empresas, que motivaram os antigos 
rivais a cooperar. Além disso, o caso avalia as capacidades da joint venture ser bem sucedida 
no mercado altamente competitivo da mobilidade, em meados de 2020. 
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Título da dissertação: YourNow: o caminho conjunto da Daimler e da BMW em direção a 
uma nova forma de mobilidade? 
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Fast-growing cities and disruptive technologies combined with an increased environmental 
consciousness are challenging the traditional and well-established automotive industry.  
According to Accenture (2018) the revenue growth of the automotive industry has reached its 
plateau, with profits shrinking slightly until 2030. However, every cloud has a silver lining, and 
in the case of the classical automotive manufacturers this silver lining is called Mobility as a 
Service (MaaS). Mobility as a Service is defined as “the integration of various forms of 
transport services into a single mobility service accessible on-demand” (Transit Protocol, 
2019). This new market sounds promising as it is expected to grow to an estimated $451bn until 
2030 within the European Union, depicting a CAGR of 25% (Statista, 2020). The opportunities 
seized by engaging in the MaaS sphere are vast: from ride-hailing to car-sharing to smart 
parking it encompasses the whole mobility experience.  
The entry barriers of this market seem to be predominantly low for the automotive 
manufacturers. However, Möller et al. (2019) estimate the investments needed to successfully 
enter this market to be around $70bn for each individual company. Consequently, traditional 
automotive manufacturers increasingly engage in partnerships to cover the enormous 
investments and risks associated with the newly established mobility market.  
As a consequence, what better way to face this challenge than to build a $1.13bn joint venture 
through Germany’s biggest and most renowned car companies – Daimler and BMW – which 
comprises the entire mobility infrastructure (Hawkins, 2019)?   
Given the high economic relevance of the automotive industry, this dissertation aims to portray 
the strategic path BMW and Daimler took to face the exogenous shocks in the manufacturing 
and car sales market. It highlights the importance of a long-term strategy, with the companies’ 
move into the previously untapped sector of MaaS, and the overall reorientation of a traditional 
industry. Furthermore, it analyzes the motives to engage in a strategic partnership as well as 
potential risks and benefits associated with joint ventures. Ultimately, this thesis might serve to 
illustrate an example of the use of the Dynamic Capabilities framework in order to evaluate 
how firms can cope with changing environments.  
After years of excessive growth in the early 2000s, the German car manufacturers have faced a 
decline in profitability, forcing them to cut expenditures, primarily by reducing personnel costs 
and by downsizing production (Manager Magazin, 2019). Focusing on bottom-line growth, 
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both companies have long been undervaluing the external environment and the potential of the 
new mobility market. Those challenges led to the question of how Daimler and BMW can use 
their mobility venture to respond to the changing market developments. The answers will be 
evaluated by using three theoretical concepts. Firstly, through the Dynamic Capabilities 
approach established by Teece et al. (1997) and refined by Barreto (2010): a four-dimensional 
strategic framework that defines DCs as “the firm’s potential to systematically solve problems, 
formed by its propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-oriented 
decisions, and to change its resource base”. Secondly, Klijn et al. (2010) provide an overview 
of the motives leading to strategic partnerships and list key success drivers for long-term 
cooperation. And lastly, a theoretical presentation of the MaaS ecosystem is provided, serving 
as an introduction to understand the industry setting of the case.  
The teaching objective of this case is for students to understand the current developments in the 
automotive industry – history, challenges, and trends – based on the real-world example of the 
Daimler and BMW mobility venture YourNow. Additionally, students are asked to classify 
those developments from a strategic management point of view by connecting the previously 
mentioned frameworks to the concepts of MaaS and the underlying case. Lastly, the endeavors 
of Daimler and BMW are critically evaluated concerning future strategic success and 
competitiveness.  
This thesis consists of five chapters. First, the Literature Review provides an overview of the 
main theoretical concepts relevant to the case. This chapter is followed by the Teaching Case 
that illustrates the case of BMW, Daimler, and their joint mobility venture YourNow. Then, the 
Teaching Notes dismantle the case from a pedagogical perspective, before the Discussion and 








2. Literature Review  
2.1  Dynamic Capabilities  
The starting point of the theoretical frameworks for this thesis is the Dynamic Capabilities (DC) 
framework. First established by Teece et al. in 1997, it has continuously gained importance in 
the area of strategic management.  
The concept of DC originates in the theory of the “resource-based view” (RBV), represented 
by scholars such as Dierickx and Cool (1989) or Barney (1986). Representatives of the RBV 
argue that the ability of a firm to achieve a competitive advantage is embedded in its coherent 
set of unique and non-replicable resources. According to Priem and Butler (2001), the approach 
illustrates a “business level” view of a firm’s assets, that challenges the earlier theories of Porter 
(1979) or Ansoff (1965), which are more focused on responding to the competitive market 
environment.  
The original RBV has been unable to answer two main questions, which have become more 
substantial given the fast technological developments in the 1990s: how to react to an ever-
changing environment and how to make the advantage sustainable (Bleady et al., 2018). As a 
response, Teece at al. (1997) introduced the idea of DC, defining it as “the firm’s ability to 
integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly 
changing environments”.  
In order to determine a firm’s unique capabilities Teece et. al (1997) established three 
categories: processes, positions, and paths.  
Processes describe organizational routines and operations, the ability to embed external 
knowledge and to spur learning. This is complemented by the necessity to observe markets and 
competition as well as to transform and reconfigure one’s assets. Consequently, the external 
environment has to be taken into account. Teece (2007) claims that the DC approach is best 
suited for underdeveloped markets subject to technological change which is rapid and 
systematic. However, Zollo and Winter (2002) suggest that DC can also play a role in slower-
moving environments, allowing for a broader application of the theory. Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) claim that not solely possessing the DC but rather having the ability to act upon them 
leads to success. Teece (2007) elucidates those thoughts by evaluating DC on the ability to 
sense external opportunities and threats, capturing those opportunities, and lastly responding 
accordingly by adapting or re-orientating the firm’s resources. Those “behaviorally based” DC 
can be extended from a psychological point of view. The three capabilities are closely related 
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to intuition and emotional reactions which are linked to neuroeconomics (Hodkinson & Healey, 
2011).  
Next, positions describe the company’s current assets. Excluding physical assets which can be 
acquired easily, the assets listed by Teece are predominantly intangible. They range from 
technology (know-how), reputation, market position to institutional assets.  
Lastly, a company possesses path dependencies, past circumstances that now influence future 
directions. Those path dependencies are, for example, influenced by network externalities and 
developed economies of scale. Furthermore, this path is shaped by technological opportunities 
that lie ahead of the company. Barreto (2010) challenges path dependencies and the underlying 
uniqueness of a firm’s DC. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) support his thinking, claiming that 
the cornerstones of DC might be similar in various corporations.  
In conclusion, DC aim at creating a competitive advantage through an improved firm 
performance. This includes paths, current processes and opportunities that lie ahead (Teece et 
al., 1997). However, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argue that DC do not serve as a source for 
a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage, especially in dynamic environments. This 
standpoint is contradicted by multiple scholars, claiming that creating DC lies at the heart of 
fast-moving markets. And due to a firm’s ability to react quickly, this creates an inimitable 
sustainable advantage (Barney & Wright, 2001; Wang & Ahmed, 2007). Synoptically, Barreto 
(2010) suggests an “indirect link” between performance and DC. He states that the latter “may 
change the resource base”, which creates a new standing in the market and consequently 
impacts the performance.  
The DC theory is considered to be relatively scattered, given several definitions and 
characteristics that developed over the years (Wang & Ahmed, 2007). This is largely due to the 
lack of quantitative assessment and its rather self-evident description of business processes 
(Winter, 2003). The theory faces several boundaries. First, there is no proven record regarding 
what type of firm profits most from the concept of DC (Barney, 1986; Barreto, 2010). Second, 
the type of external environment, in which the development of DC generates the most return is 
controversial and has yet to be researched (Barreto, 2010).  
Hence, to assess the current state of the DC view, Barreto (2010) proposes an amended 
definition that takes into account the previously mentioned critiques. He defines DC as “the 
firm’s potential to systematically solve problems, formed by its propensity to sense 
opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change its 
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resource base”. This definition allows scholars to analyze the concept of DC from four 
dimensions. Firstly, the ability to sense opportunities and threats, which means scanning the 
external environment and the capabilities landscape. Secondly, the skill to make timely 
decisions, which is consistent with what was highlighted by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000): 
responding quickly is regarded as a capability itself. Thirdly, those decisions need to be market-
oriented, which involves the ability to respond to customer behaviour and preferences (Priem, 
2007). Lastly, the capacity to change the firm's resource base is vital, meaning that a company 
continuously has to reinvent its required resources to stay competitive. Conceptualizing DC as 
an “aggregate multidimensional construct” (Barreto, 2010), allows scholars to unravel the 
theoretical concept of DC, making it more tangible and applicable to real-world business cases.  
 
2.2 Joint Venture  
Intensifying competition, fast global market developments, and quick technological changes 
are drivers for companies to engage in strategic alliances, one of them being joint ventures (JV; 
Yasuda, 2005). JVs are “separate entities owned jointly by two or more firms that represent a 
partial combination of their resources” (Johnson & Houston, 2000). In comparison to M&A 
activities, the JV partners remain autonomous, oftentimes settling for a 50-50 ownership 
(Moskalev & Swensen, 2007). JVs are typically horizontally or vertically structured, with a 
horizontal JV displaying a balanced relationship whereas a vertical JV depicts a “buyer-seller 
relationship” (Lou, 2002). JVs are used as cooperative strategies in mature markets, 
predominantly to influence the competitive conditions (Harrigan, 1988) or as an accelerator for 
expansion (Tsang, 1998). According to Harrington (1988), the occurrence and the form of joint 
ventures depends on various factors such as demand uncertainty and growth, product 
differentiation, customer sophistication, or the industry structure.  
Primarily, JVs serve as a means to reduce costs and risks for the partner companies. This 
includes the sharing of investment costs and risk diversification among multiple companies and 
projects (Klijn et al., 2010). Besides the obvious cost savings in production through economies 
of scale, Kogut (1988) underlines the importance of transaction costs, namely administrative 
tasks and the power of relationships.  
Furthermore, collaborating in a JV increases the companies’ market power, be it through 
expansion or a more effective competitive position (Klijn et al., 2010). Especially when aiming 
to achieve international expansion, JVs abroad help a domestic company to enter a new market 
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(Gomes-Casseres, 1989). However, the creation of synergies is mainly associated with 
horizontal joint ventures, while operational synergies predominantly appear in JVs of similar 
companies (Johnson & Houston, 2000; Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992).  
Another motive closely linked to market power is the ability to combine knowledge, 
particularly in the field of technology (Klijn et al., 2010). Innovative companies are more 
inclined to engage in strategic partnerships, generally leveraging the positive relationship 
between R&D and profitability (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad 1994). JVs can “supplement 
existing resource-based advantages” (Brouthers et al., 2008), which inspire the development 
of new capabilities. Especially highly technological industries call for strategic alliances, due 
to their fast-paced market environment (Vilkamo & Keil, 2003). Hereby, a JV is the best option 
for multiple business partners to transfer knowledge and technology (Wahab, 2010). 
Concerning the motivational ability, Habib and Mella-Barral (2007) summarize that “to acquire 
skills and technical knowhow” is the main motive for firms to engage in a JV.  
Whereas the previously mentioned motives to engage in a JV are more practical, managerial 
aspects are becoming more significant. Managers sometimes do not act in the firm’s best 
interest. They might engage in a strategic alliance to profit from the increased power the alliance 
offers them in terms of budget or managerial responsibility (Das et al., 1998). Those agency 
problems (managers vs. stockholders) can ultimately result in inefficiencies and losses for 
stockholders, since the decision making authority lies in the management’s hands (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). 
According to Kogut (1991), nearly 70% of all JVs fail, given the high potential for conflict in 
this type of business partnership. From plant location, to growth plans to advertisement budget 
– every decision could lead to discrepancies between the partners. So how is it possible to 
successfully create and manage a JV? Das and He (2006) differentiate between “task-related 
criteria” and “partner-related criteria”. Hereby, task relatedness encompasses the companies’ 
resources, technological capabilities, reputation as well as management style. Furthermore, 
connecting the task-related criteria to the DC theory, achieving a fit here helps partners to create 
and assess new capabilities. Partner-related criteria, on the other hand, consist of strategic fit, 
objectives, and commitment. Additionally, the creation of reasonable expectations on both sides 
and the generation of trust serve as the main pillars for a successful strategic alliance (Elmuti 
& Kathawala, 2001). Ultimately, Harrigan (1986) summarizes both aspects stating that a 




2.3 Mobility as a Service  
Kumaraswamy et al. (2018) describe the 21st century as “an era of continual disruption”, in 
which technological innovation questions and overrules existing business models. Those 
innovations are blurring the lines between consumers and producers through the emergence of 
the sharing economy. Consumption has moved from the ultimate goal of ownership to an 
“access-based consumption”, which is defined as “transactions that may be market mediated 
in which no transfer of ownership takes place” (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2012). This new form of 
collaborative consumption has largely been motivated by the development of the Web 2.0 
(Belk, 2014). One of the industries that has moved into this direction, especially due to 
technological advancements, is the transport industry (Jittrapirom, et al., 2017). Comparable to 
a mobile phone subscription, nowadays transport services are tailored to the customer’s needs 
and are easily adaptable (Hietanen, 2014). The combination of the transport industry with the 
new form of ownership can be compiled in the term “Mobility as a Service” (MaaS). Its main 
advantages, compared to traditional forms of transportation, are flexibility, ease of use, and 
transparent pricing (Kamargianni & Matyas, 2017). The International Association of Public 
Transport (2011) distinguishes between public vs. private access as well as collective use vs. 
individual use. Furthermore, it limits the scope of transport modes that are available for MaaS, 
namely (shared) taxi, bike-sharing, car-sharing, renting services as well as car pooling. 
Predominantly, those services combine the ideas of individual use on the one hand, while being 
publicly accessible on the other (Appendix 1). Wong et al. (2018) differentiate the services in 
terms of mode (road vs. air), product type, and ownership type, consequently enabling a broader 
and more futuristic view of the concept.  
Due to the innovative nature of MaaS, the characteristics are flowing and continuously 
expanding. Nevertheless, recent research proposes the following main characteristics of MaaS 
solutions. Firstly, multiple forms of transportation are combined in one digital platform, mainly 
app-based. Through this platform users can gather information and book their preferred 
transport service (Jittrapirom et al., 2017). Tickets and payments are already integrated, 
ensuring a seamless transaction (Kamargianni et al., 2016). Furthermore, it tracks real-time 
supply and demand and informs the user accordingly (Utriainen & Pöllänen, 2018). Secondly, 
MaaS is user-centric, it offers personalized information, such as recommendations and removes 
the consumer’s hassle of finding the right transport option (Jittrapirom et al., 2017). Lastly, the 
MaaS ecosystem combines several types of public and private transport. This includes for 
example ride-hailing (RH), car-sharing (CS), and bicycles, which can be booked altogether. 
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Overall, the objective of the MaaS infrastructure is to achieve a new level of transport, that 




3. Teaching Case 
“But time is changing. There are people who are not interested in car ownership, but in 
mobility. Individual mobility, on-demand.” 
           - Dieter Zetsche, Daimler CEO 
“We can combine our strengths and become a champion. This is the vision.“ 
           - Harald Krüger, BMW CEO 
In February 2019, Daimler and BMW, two of the world’s leading car manufacturers, announced 
their JV in the start-up hub Berlin. Consistent with the location, they presented their new 
mobility venture YourNow, which encompassed five pillars: ReachNow, ChargeNow, 
ParkNow, FreeNow, and ShareNow. Those entities contained 14 different brands with more 
than 60 million active usersi, underlining where the companies were heading, namely towards 
“sustainable, connected and future-oriented urban mobility”.ii The traditional manufacturers 
were thus embracing new business models such as car-sharing, ride-hailing, digital parking, 
and electronic charging. Given the reduced growth in vehicle sales on the one hand and the 
increased potential of new business areas on the other, the companies were aiming for the $1.5 
trillion automotive revenue pool created by new mobility (Appendix 2).iii However, due to this 
paradigm shift in the mobility sphere, the manufacturers not only had to face inter-industrial 
competition but were also competing against technology giants such as Uber and Google.iv 
Consequently, Franz Reiner, CEO of Daimler’s Mobility AG, believed that the JV had been the 
logical next step, since “Partnerships are becoming increasingly important to succeed in the 
market”.v   
The venture consisted of a 50:50 ownership split, which provided both companies with equal 
decision-making authority.vi Given these challenges, both firms planned to invest around 
€1.13bn in the venture, creating approximately 1,000 new jobs.ii In order to catch up with 
existing technology players, the companies were willing to increase investments through 
external partners, ultimately aiming at listing the venture at the German stock exchange. The 
balance sheet valuation of the JV was set at €3.3bn internally in 2019; new financial 
investments could push the valuation to more than €5bn.vii The numbers sounded promising, 
nevertheless, the question remained whether the JV was the right decision for the car 
manufacturers. What led to the venture? Did the venture serve as the further development of 





3.1 From the first automobile to the leading luxury car manufacturer: Daimler AG 
History  
When Carl Benz patented the first version of the modern automobile, the so-called “Motor-
wagen”, in 1886 nobody could have imagined the sweeping implications this innovation was 
going to have on modern-day transportation.viii From the first test drive to the economic crisis 
in the 1920s – the first steps of the new automobile were full of stumbling blocks. Benz’s 
competitors Gottlieb Daimler and Wilhelm Maybach were facing similar problems, but focused 
their strategy on their newly developed combustion engine. The merger of the Daimler-
Motoren-Gesellschaft and the Benz & Cie. was signed on June 28, 1926, resulting in the 
Daimler AG with their newly created brand Mercedes-Benz.ix After the war, the company 
profited from the "economic miracle”, achieving a one billion dollar turnover for the first time 
and breaking sales records. Daimler-Benz expanded into new markets, started outsourcing 
production, and capitalized on the rapid industrialization in the 1950s.ix In 1998, Daimler 
merged with Chrysler and formed the DaimlerChrysler AG, with the ultimate goal to create the 
“world-leading automotive group”. The deal was annulled in 2009 due to miscommunication 
and Chrysler’s weak performance, and resulted in a loss of around €40bn for Daimler.x After 
the economic crisis in 2008, Daimler diversified its portfolio in the area of trucks and vans. 
Furthermore, the company invested heavily in the Asian market, reaching double-digits in sales 
growth, primarily in China. The years after 2012 heralded the company’s future orientation: 
electric mobility, autonomous driving, and the mobility JV.xi  
 
Financial Outlook  
As of November 25, 2019, the company was divided into four business units, the parent 
company Daimler AG (strategy, governance, and services), Mercedes-Benz AG (cars and 
vans), Daimler Truck AG (trucks and busses), and the Daimler Mobility AG (Mobility and 
Financial Services). Even though the company sold around 2.4m cars in 2019 – a new record – 
EBIT decreased significantly and dropped by almost 50% compared to 2018 (Appendix 3).xii 
The most promising markets were China, Germany, and South Korea, all depicting a positive 
development from 2018 to 2019. However, especially the truck, van, and bus branches were 
struggling, displaying a negative or stagnating EBIT. Looking at the company’s ten-year 
development it became apparent that overall revenue was still growing but slowing down. R&D 
expenditures had increased dramatically from 2013 onwards, which was also reflected in the 
increased capital expenditure investments. As a result, the operating margin experienced a sharp 
 
 11 
decline in 2017.xii This was due to problems such as the China-US trade dispute, mass recalls 
because of the diesel scandal, and internal inefficiencies.xiii 
 
3.2 An innovative force in the heart of Bavaria: BMW 
History  
The “Bayrische Motoren Werke” AG was founded in 1916 by Karl Rapp and Gustav Otto, 
proudly presenting its iconic logo, which incorporated the Bavarian flag, in 1917. The company 
produced its first motorcycle in 1923, followed by the first car in 1928. In the following years 
the company had a diverse product portfolio, producing luxury cars and motorcycles, as well 
as airplane engines during the war. The first post-war automobile was produced in 1951. 
However, BMW was struggling in the commercial sector and was almost bought by Daimler 
in 1959.xiv With the introduction of the “New Class” in 1962 the rise of the sports car started, 
and likewise the rise of BMW as one of the world’s leading car manufacturers. BMW acquired 
the British Rover Group, including brands like Land Rover and Mini, in 1994 and Rolls Royce 
in 1998. However, as a consequence of a company realignment in 2000, the firm ended up 
selling the Rover Group, keeping only Mini within BMW. In 2007 the company presented its 
“Strategy Number ONE” which outlined BMW’s long-term future strategy. In the company’s 
2020 mission statement the goal became clear: “to become the world’s leading provider of 
premium products and premium services for individual mobility”.xv  
 
Financial Outlook  
BMW’s vehicle deliveries have increased steadily over the last ten years, resulting in around 
2.5m automobiles and 175k motorcycles sold in 2019. Coherently, revenue was on an all-time 
high in 2019. This was primarily due to the 16% sales growth in China that offset the decline 
in the European and American markets. Looking at financial figures, such as EBIT and return 
on sales, the numbers have decreased since 2017 (Appendix 4).xvi However, as stated by 
chairman Oliver Zipse the company was “working intensively to bring the EBIT margin in the 
Automotive Segment back within our target range of 8 to 10 percent”. Consequently, BMW 
was heavily investing in electric and hybrid solutions, with the goal to produce more than one 
million electric vehicles by 2021. To compensate for the heavy investments, BMW 
simultaneously aimed at reducing expenditures by €12bn until 2022, mainly by cutting down 




3.3 Looking further down the Road: The New Mobility Market 
According to KPMG Consultingxviii three megatrends were shaping the future of mobility: i) 
connected and autonomous vehicles, ii) electric vehicles and alternative powertrains, and iii) 
mobility as a service. Through those developments the mobility market was expected to double 
its size until 2030.xix In the last couple of years the traditional carmakers faced enormous 
challenges after a decade of high profits, with operating profits declining sharply (Appendix 
5).xx What challenges were automakers like BMW and Daimler facing? And what opportunities 
did new business models offer in order to circumvent those obstacles? McKinsey differentiated 
between short-term and long-term challenges.xxx 
 
Short-term Challenges 
Mostly, challenges could arise from geopolitical and market-specific risks such as trade wars, 
Brexit, and market saturation. The US-China trade war in 2019 led to a €300m loss for BMW 
and Daimler even readjusted its profit targets due to the conflict.xxi Furthermore, the formerly 
fast-growing Chinese market was slowing down. Whereas in 2007 car ownership was at only 
6.1 cars per 100 households, this number had increased to 37.5 in 2017. Especially the urban 
upper and middle class households were well-equipped, lessening potential future sales.xxii In 
addition, governmental CO2 limits were challenging the manufacturers. Those limits differed 
worldwide, however, in Europe emissions had to be reduced by 37.5% until 2030.xxiii In order 
to circumvent those regulations, many companies engaged in illegal procedures that ultimately 
resulted in the diesel emissions scandal. The scandal led to high litigation costs, with Daimler 
expecting to pay up to €1.5bn to German authorities.xxiv Lastly, “classic automotive drivers”, 
such as segment shifts, intense competition, and new entrants were challenging the traditional 
market players. Examples were specialized players such as Tesla or the “big four” Chinese car 
manufacturers.iii  
 
Long-term Challenges  
From a long-term strategic perspective, two challenges had been sticking out: the investment 
in new technologies and the change in consumer behavior. The technological investment 
focused primarily on the three megatrends mentioned earlier. A successful development of all 
three areas would require an individual manufacturer to invest more than $70bn within ten 
years.xxx To develop those new technologies faster, manufacturers were heavily investing in 
technology companies, especially start-ups. Daimler for example had funded more than 20 new 
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entrants with approximately $19bn. The scope of involvement ranged from investment, to 
M&A, to creating accelerators.xxv Overall, R&D investments were being redistributed, 
switching from the product itself to software solutions.xxvi Given the high financing costs, it 
was essential for companies to decide on the right mobility strategy. “The automotive revolution 
required more than a gut feeling to drive the right decisions for a successful mobility 
strategy”xxvii, thus, thoughtfully deciding on how to use those investments could be challenging 
and rewarding at once.  
Another long-term challenge was changing consumer behavior. The automotive industry was 
largely influenced by “the consumers of tomorrow”, a younger, tech-savvy generation. 
Technology as well as sustainability played an important part in their daily lives. In urban areas 
public transport served as the main type of transport in the EU, with car-sharing and alternative 
mobility solutions on the rise. In China, multi-purpose apps for ride- and car-sharing were 
popular. In rural areas car ownership prevailed, however, the car itself was rather seen as a 
functional product and lost its role as a status symbol. PwC differentiated between three 
different buyer personas and three different markets, underlining the consumer complexity and 
future indications for the car manufacturers (Appendix 6).xxxvii 
 
Car-sharing  
The “consumer of tomorrow” was mostly living in big or medium-sized cities; 54% of them 
were using CS services regularly.xxviii Although the concept had first been established in the 
US, the concept quickly developed in Europe, with 5.8m users and 68,000 cars in 2016. The 
market was expected to grow by 32% (CAGR) until 2020, with Germany being the biggest 
market in Europe. CS services were classified into three business models, which were mainly 
distinguished by price and flexibility: peer-to-peer CS, stationary CS, and free-floating CS.xxix  
Peer-to-peer CS was seen as a niche product, representing only 6% of providers.xxx Private 
individuals offered their car on a platform, allowing others access to the car. Users paid a daily 
price to use the car, which positioned the service as a direct competitor to rental car services. 
The market leader was US-based Turo which raised about $450m in funding and started to 
expand its business to the UK and Germany in 2018.xxxi The segment was promising, having 
depicted the highest growth in CS memberships from 2019 to 2024.xxxii 
Stationary CS consisted of fixed stations where customers picked up and dropped off the rental 
car. The service was used for longer drives and targeted at rural areas or medium-sized cities. 
Stationary CS were often financed publically or through private investments. The biggest player 
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in Germany was Flinkster, which was financed by Deutsche Bahn, the national railway 
provider.xli 
Free-floating CS accounted for 90% of the European CS providers.xxxiii The vehicle was picked 
up and returned anywhere within a specific area. The main advantage was flexibility; the service 
was primarily used for short trips in urban areas. The pay-as-you-go model provided users with 
low entry barriers, which led to a high growth in market share of 9% from 2017 to 2018. As of 
2016 the biggest market was Asia, followed by Europe and North America.xlii The market was 
estimated to generate revenues of €4.7bn yearly, with approximately 35m users worldwide in 
2021.xxxiv The majority of free-floating CS were owned by car manufacturers, which primarily 
used the service as a strategic foothold in the new mobility sector. As of 2018, the market leader 
in Europe and North America was car2go (Daimler brand) with 24m rentals and 3m users 
worldwide.xxxv Other big players were BMW’s DriveNow (1m users in 2017) and Fiat’s Enjoy. 
In China the market was extremely fragmented and 90% of the providers were local.xxxvi  
 
Ride-hailing 
RH companies offered a “platform where individuals could hail and pay for a ride from a 
professional or part-time driver through an app”. The service emerged in 2009, supported by 
the development of GPS, digital road maps, and smartphone penetration.xxxvii As of 2020 the 
RH market encompassed 1.14bn users, corresponding to a user penetration of 15.4%. The 
average revenue per user was at $190, depicting a CAGR of the whole market of 13.7% from 
2020 to 2023. The RH market was by far the fastest-growing in the MaaS sector, due to a 
straightforward business model which consisted of an app-based approach and cars owned by 
private drivers. Consequently, entry barriers were low and competition was fierce.xxxviii The 
main markets were China and the US with a booking volume of $11bn that was expected to 
grow to more than $25bn in 2021.xxxix The US market was twofold, with Uber having 
maintained a 70% and Lyft a 30% market share. Uber held a first-mover advantage, having 
established wide-ranging network effects since entering the market in 2009. Furthermore, both 
companies were diversifying their portfolio into areas such as scooter and bike sharing, as well 
as food delivery.xl The biggest RH market was Asia: of the 16bn rides conducted in 2017 
worldwide, 70% had been completed in Asia. China, was dominated by Didi Chuxing with a 
90% market share and more than 15m daily users. Didi had already outperformed Uber on the 
continent, and was aiming at “competing with Uber globally”, according to its cofounder.xli 
Europe had been dominated by strict government regulations and strong taxi unions, which 
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made it hard for RH to conquer the market.xlii As of 2019 Uber had invested heavily in the 
European market, however, it faced competition from local players. Mytaxi served as Europe’s 
biggest licensed taxi app and dominated in Germany and Spain. Bolt (former Taxify) with its 
25m users, Yandex in Russia as well as Kapten in France were the main players in the European 
market.xliii 
 
Digital Parking & Electronic Charging 
With the emergence of smart city solutions, digital parking had developed into one of the 
fastest-growing ideas to help cope with urbanization. The app-based systems used “real-time 
data and applications, and low-cost sensors that enable users to observe […] parking 
locations”. The benefits were wide-ranging. Parking became more efficient for the users and 
new revenue streams e.g. through loyalty programs emerged for the providers. For the 
community, traffic and pollution were reduced.xliv The opportunities for the asset-intensive 
sector had been huge: As of 2017 there were around 155m regulated parking spaces in the EU, 
each generating an estimate of 780€ per year, and on average a car was parked approximately 
90% of its time.xlv Furthermore, while in 2019 only 11% of parking spaces worldwide were 
digitalxlvi and the smart parking market was about to grow by 20% yearly up until 2025.xlvii The 
market in Europe was fragmented and reached from simple parking reservation apps for cities, 
to fully autonomous parking apps regulated by on-site sensors. The industry players consisted 
of automotive companies, startups and telecommunication providers. Due to the market 
characteristics, M&As as well as strategic partnerships were frequent, and aimed at capturing 
promising geographic markets.xlviii  
The development of the MaaS sector went hand-in-hand with the advancing electrification of 
vehicles. The sales of electric and hybrid vehicles were growing rapidlyxlix, however, this 
growth required the expansion of the respective charging network. For the EU, to reach its goal 
to be climate-neutral in 2050, there needed to be 15 times more charging stations available to 
close the “charging gap”.l Consequently, the electric charging infrastructure would create a 
completely new industry and, thus, market opportunity, which entailed a “digital ‘smartness’” 
such as transparent pricing and smooth payment.li The market consisted of two actors: e-
mobility service providers and charge point operators. The service providers offered access to 
various charging stations, either of their own or third-party providers. An app helped to find the 
stations and to process payment. Charge point operators owned and maintained the 
infrastructure and set prices.lii This capital-intensive sector was dominated by established 
 
 16 
players from the power industry, oil and gas, automotive, as well as industrial manufacturing.liii 
As of 2018 the “battle for electric car supremacy” was still ongoing. Whoever was able to 
achieve the critical mass of the charging infrastructure first, might be the one to dominate this 
new industry.liv  
 
3.4 On the road to success? The milestones of the mobility joint venture 
“Growth is compulsory”, this statement by Daimler CEO Dieter Zetsche summarized the 
motivation to engage in the mobility venture with BMW. “If you see changes but you avoid to 
approach them, you are lost” he added, alluding to the challenges faced by both companies in 
the automotive segment.lv However, it took some time to get used to seeing those two 
companies together, having been direct rivals for decades. It was safe to say that the 
collaboration was no spontaneous idea but a longstanding development from both sides. The 
motives and risks had been evaluated and the path had been set. Nevertheless, a glance into the 
past, present, and future of the JV is necessary to further understand its significance.  
    
Joint ventures, M&As, and buy-outs – everyday business for Daimler and BMW?  
Besides their internal expenditures in the mobility sector, both companies had been heavily 
investing, buying, and partnering with emerging mobility startups (Appendix 7).  
Daimler had a diversivied portfolio in the mobility sector. It reached from classical RH 
companies like MyTaxi, the US-based company RideScoutlvi, a 60% stake in Hailolvii to a $20m 
investment in Blacklane, an on-demand limousine service.lviii Additionally, the company had 
invested in mass transport: it was engaged in a partnership with Clevershuttle, a ride-pooling 
servicelix, and had a stake in Flixbus, the half a billion Euro rated intercity bus service.lx Besides 
on-road services, Daimler had been funding the flying taxi startup Velocopter with $30m.lxi  
BMW started its mobility investment in 2014 with a stake in RideCell, a leading software 
provider for MaaS.lxii Further funding included the carpooling service Scoop, the local journey 
planer Moovit, as well as the new-generation car rental company Skurt.  
BMW, Daimler, and Audi announced their acquisition of Nokia’s mapping and location service 
in August 2015. The deal, which cost the automakers €2.8bn, was classified as a competitive 
move against Google, which relied heavily on accurate mapping systems for its self-driving 
cars.lxiii Daimler additionally invested in Starship, a delivery robot company, ultimately aiming 
at robots delivering goods out of Mercedes vans.lxiv BMW had engaged in 3D printing through 
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companies like Carbon and DesktopMetal. The company also had a stake in Nauto, a self-
driving startup, together with GM and Toyota.lxv  
Daimler launched its accelerator “Startup Autobahn”, “an innovation platform that opens its 
doors to entrepreneurship in the mobility sector” in mid-2016. The accelerator screened around 
1,000 mobility startups yearly, offering 30 of them exclusive collaborations with companies 
such as Daimler, BASF, and Linde. The offered services reached from mobile payment systems 
to AI to blockchain.lxvi BMW’s €500m venture capital fund “BMW i Ventures” invested, inter 
alia, in the areas of autonomous driving, digital car, on-demand mobility, and digital life.lxvii As 
of 2017, BMW and Daimler had stakes in 37 and 36 startups respectively – exemplary for the 
venture capital efforts of carmakers in startups.lxviii  
 
How two became one – the development of the YOUR NOW mobility JV 
Besides their investments in external partnerships, the companies had been heavily investing in 
mobility solutions internally (Appendix 8). As of 2019, the newly developed Daimler Mobility 
unit was the company’s only business department that was displaying a positive financial 
trend.xii The division incorporated financial services (leasing, insurance), fleet management as 
well as digital mobility solutions. Daimler was pioneering the car-sharing market with car2go 
since its launch in 2008 and was heavily expanding in European and North American 
markets.lxix BMW started the new mobility era with DriveNow in 2011, together with the 
German rental car company Sixt.lxx In the US the company launched ReachNow, a 
multimodality app that combined multiple types of transport in one app.lxxi ParkNow was 
launched in the US in 2015. Additionally, the company launched the digital charging service 
ChargeNow.lxxii 
The first speculations about the JV started in the beginning of 2017. The plans intensified in 
May 2017, claiming that both companies were aiming to merge their mobility services in the 
third quarter of 2017. The overall goal was to establish entry barriers for competitors like 
Google and Uber. Furthermore, consolidating the companies’ client base to scale operations. 
As a prerequisite both companies had to repurchase the shares of their car-sharing venture 
partners. BMW paid €209m for the 50% DriveNow shares of Sixt and Daimler purchased 25% 
of car2go shares from Europcar.lxxiii The JV was officially announced at the end of March 2018. 
Both companies had been negotiating for more than one year, which was mainly due to 
discussions about an adequate valuation of the JV.lxxiv Until then, Daimler was generating 
€167bn and BMW €99bn with their respective mobility solutions.lv To launch the JV, the 
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companies’ next step was to convince the European and US competition authorities. The 
automakers succeeded and the JV was approved by the authorities at the end of 2018.lxxv After 
having received legal consent, the JV was launched on 22nd of February 2019. The new brand 
YourNow combined a total of 14 brands with 60m users. Just after the launch YourNow 
encompassed five pillars which represented the main business areas (Appendix 9):  
1. FreeNow: Ride-hailing – contained companies such as MyTaxi, Kapten or Beat 
2. ShareNow: Car-sharing – included the two companies car2go and DriveNow 
3. ReachNow: Multimodal mobility platform for the North American market – offered a 
MaaS platform that combined all mobility services in one app  
4. ParkNow: Digital parking platform – included companies such as ParkNow, 
ParkMobile 
5. ChargeNow: Electronic charging network (e-mobility service provider) 
To accelerate growth, both companies announced an investment of €1.13bn in the new JV.i 
Besides the internal investment, Daimler and BMW were further looking for external investors, 
having been in contact with financial investors as well as other automakers.vi By the end of 
2019, the JV had published its ambitious growth plan, which aimed at combining the originally 
five pillars to only three pillars: 1. FreeNow & ReachNow 2. ShareNow 3. ParkNow & 
ChargeNow. The first developments sounded promising and user numbers had increased by 
44% since the launch of the JV, to 90m users worldwide. Especially FreeNow contributed to 
the growth, with the number of trips increasing by 120% and a revenue of €2bn in 2019.lxxvi 
However, the established car-sharing division of the companies had developed into a problem 
child. ShareNow was pulled out of the North American market and the UK in early 2020 due 
to a lack of demand and high costs. Daimler and BMW highlighted that ShareNow will continue 
its operations in profitable European locationslxxvii, while at the same time announcing to 
restructure the JV to “pave the way for profitable growth”.lxxviii As of the 1st of January 2020 
the new umbrella organization managing the three pillars was launched. Only in mid-January 
2020 the new ShareNow app went live, which combined the previously separate entities car2go 
and DriveNow.lxxix The publishing of the app was seen as a milestone by the two companies, 







A windy road ahead – what is next for the JV?  
As of 2019 automotive manufacturers generated 99% of their revenue through car sales. By 
2035, this number was projected to decrease to 60%, while new mobility concepts were 
supposed to account for 40% of revenue.lxxxi  
However, the process to embed mobility services into the companies’ business had proven to 
be more difficult than expected. Firstly, the strategic investments in new mobility did not pay 
off immediately. The services took time to generate a user base and to become profitable. 
According to experts, mobility concepts that had been established until 2019 would only 
generate profits earliest 2025.lxxxii One example was CS, which faced extreme price pressure. 
On average, one car was estimated to generate 45€ per day. But competition was tense and the 
service asset-intensive. Consequently, the service’s profitability was low and needed to be 
backed by investors. Yet, this implied a huge risk, due to them losing interest because of lacking 
profits and extensive testing which was needed to identify favorable markets.lxxxiii Secondly, 
technology players were entering the market and fighting for a lead. Compared to the 
manufacturers those technology companies had extremely high cash reserves and market 
valuations, which provided them with enormous cash resources and, hence, financial flexibility. 
This resulted in tech players spending over 10% of their revenue in R&D, while the automakers 
contributed less than 5%.lxxxiv In various areas, incumbents were miles ahead, with Uber and 
Didi having achieved more than $50bn in valuation and traditional manufacturers placed in the 
follower position.lxxxv Lastly, especially regarding the new mobility target customer, the 
companies were in need to realign their image. The heritage aspect had become less important 
for young customers, as opposed to a brand equity that was comprised of innovation and 
digitization.lxxxvi Both companies have been entangled in the diesel emission scandal. 
Consequently, customer trust had been lost, which had resulted in customers doubting the 
companies’ promise to work for a more sustainable urban environment.lxxxvii  
But there was also hope for the JV and the future orientation of both companies. Their 
cooperation had been a huge success factor. Sharing investment burdens served as a motive for 
two-thirds of automotive partnerships since 2004. By engaging in YourNow, as well as 
incorporating further partnerships and M&As in the JV, Daimler and BMW underlined their 
willingness to innovate and to invest in the future.lxxxviii Furthermore, the manufacturers had 
existing and long-established capabilities that provided them with an initial competitive 
advantage. They were in the front row to leverage this opportunity – “so long as they can bolster 
their existing capabilities around creating and manufacturing cars, and build new capabilities 
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around ideating, testing, and rolling out mobility and digital services.” Both companies had the 
means and experience to follow a “full mobility provider” business model (Appendix 10) by 
complementing their existing capabilities and by developing their future capabilities.lxxxix  
As of 2020 the mobility JV of BMW and Daimler was still in its initial phase, having completed 
one full year which served as an indicator to where it was heading. The overall objective was 
to solve the problem of new mobility, sensing the opportunities of changing consumer behavior 
and technological developments on the one hand, while dealing with new technology entrants 
and declining profits in the core business on the other hand. The ability to make “timely and 
market-oriented decisions” required extensive and fast-paced R&D investments as well as 
flexible business models. Consequently, having complemented one’s existing capabilities while 
consistently adapting them to a changing external environment might have created the 
companies’ opportunity to seize the market. However, only time will tell whether the road they 
took will lead them to the pole position in the mobility segment or whether they will be 
















Appendix 3: Financial Key Figures Daimler, Ten Year Summaryxci 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
€ amounts in millions
From the statements of income
Revenue 97.761 106.540 114.297 117.982 129.872 149.467 153.261 164.154 167.362 172.745
Personnel expenses1 16.454 17.424 18.002 18.753 19.607 20.949 21.141 22.186 22.432 22.657
Research and development expenditure2 4.849 5.634 5.644 5.489 5.68 6.564 7.572 8.711 9.107 9.662
thereof capitalized 1.373 1.460 1.465 1.284 1.148 1.804 2.315 2.773 2.526 3.076
EBIT1 7.274 8.755 8.820 10.815 10.752 13.186 12.902 14.348 11.132 4.329
Operating margin (%)1 7,4 8,2 7,7 9,2 8,3 8,8 8,4 8,7 6,7 2,5
Profit (loss) before income taxes1 6.628 8.449 8.116 10.139 10.173 12.744 12.574 13.967 10.595 3.83
Net operating profit (loss)1 5.120 6.240 7.302 9.173 7.678 9.007 9.007 10.88 7.963 3.068
as % of net assets (RONA)1, 3 17,5 19,9 19,6 22,6 18,8 20,1 19,1 22,5 14,8 4,8
Net profit (loss)1 4.674 6.029 6.830 8.720 7.290 8.711 8.784 10.617 7.582 2.709
Net profit (loss) per share (€)1 4,28 5,32 6,02 6,40 6,40 7,87 7,97 9,61 6,78 2,22
Total dividend 1.971 2.346 2.349 2.407 2.621 3.477 3.477 3.905 3.477 963
Dividend per share (€) 1,85 2,20 2,20 2,25 2,45 3,25 3,25 3,65 3,25 0,90
1 The figures for the year 2012 have been adjusted, primarily due to effects arising from application of the amended version of IAS 19.
3 In the context of fine tuning the performance measurement system, the definition of net assets has been adjusted with retroactive effect as of 2015.






Appendix 4: Financial Key Figures BMW, Ten Year Summaryxcii
2019 2018 1 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010
€ amounts in millions
Revenues 104.21 96.855 98.282 94.163  92.175  80.401  76.059  76.848  68.821  60.477
Gross profit margin  in % 17,3 19,0 20,3 19,9 19,7 21,2 20,1 20,2 21,1 18,1
Earnings before financial result 7.411 8.933 9.899 9.386  9.593  9.118  7.978  8.275  8.018  5.111
Earnings before tax 7.118 9.627 10.675 9.665  9.224  8.707  7.893  7.803  7.383  4.853
Return on sales (earnings before tax / revenues) in % 6,8 9,9 10,9 10,3 10,0 10,8 10,4 10,2 10,7 8,0
Net profit for the year 5.022 7.064 8.675 6.910  6.396  5.817  5.329  5.111  4.907  3.243
Dividend total 1.646 2.303 2.630 2.300  2.102  1.904  1.707  1.640  1.508  852
Dividend per share of common stock / preferred stock 2,50 /2,52 3,50 / 3,52 4,00 / 4,02 3,50 / 3,52  3,20 / 3,22  2,90 / 2,92  2,60 / 2,62 2,50 /2,52  2,30 / 2,32  1,30 / 1,32
1 Prior year’s figures adjusted due to a change in accounting policy in connection with the adoption of IFRS 16; see note 6 to the Group Financial Statements. 
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Appendix 6: Comparison of global customer personasxxxvii (easc = electrified, autonomous, shared, connected) 
eascy – Five trends transforming the Automotive Industry   15
Fig. 2 Comparison of global personas 
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modern • Technical innovations 
are part of everyday life: 
Use of smartphones 
and apps for urban 
transport
• Sustainable and healthy 
lifestyle demands pragmatic view 
of cars as transportation
• Increased inter-modal transport 
(car versus public transport)
• Car ownership less important as 
a status symbol





• Huge interest in 
digital technology and 
innovative mobility 
concepts
• Young, urban users 
in particular choose 
variety of transport options that 
do not involve owning a car
• Rural areas are still dependent 
on cars due to insufficient 
infrastructure for long-distance 
travel
• Journeys in urban areas often 






• Young, urban 
generation experiences 
economic upswing
• New technologies are 
actively embraced
• Car-sharing and ride-
sharing services very popular 
(e.g.: Didi Chuxing App with  
> 400 m users)
• Need for own car limited to social 
status
• Long-distance journeys in rural 












transitory • Individuality and 
consumption behaviour 
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of different mobility 
profiles
• Primarily young, urban 
users use alternatives such as 
car-sharing
• The still traditionally-oriented user 
group continues to prefer owning 






• Both traditional and 
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• Public transport plays a 
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traditional • Mainly rural population 
that tends to shy away 
from technological 
innovations
• Ownership or access to 
own car is the norm
• In urban environments, they often 
turn to public transport to avoid 





• Predominantly older 
groups of society with 
deeply entrenched 
values and convictions
• Larger share of rural 
population in segment 
comparison
• Mobility is almost exclusively 
equated with own car






• Public transport 
preferred, especially in 
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• Comparatively open 
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• Car use for reasons of flexibility 
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Appendix 7: Timeline of Daimler’s and BMW’s M&A activities (own illustration; based on 




Appendix 8: Timeline of internal developments leading to the YourNow Joint Venture (own 
illustration; based on available information on the web) 
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Appendix 10: Mobility Business Model Options for OEMsxciv 
BMW Group Investor Presentation, September 2019 Page 20
YOUR NOW JOINT VENTURE. THE "MOBILITY POWERHOUSE" WITH A 










>4 30.4 7.5 33.4* 0.02 >75
18.2 122.0 16.4 111.9* 0.12 268.6
31 130 22 >1,200* n/a >1,200
3.4*
* For the U.S. entity of PARKNOW, the June 2019 figures are estimated. 
** Partially, customer data is aggregated and thus, data summation is w/o the consideration of possible redundancies. 
*** Monthly gross merchandise value run rate is based on the previous month’s figure.
ADOPTING NEW BUSINESS MODELS
To compete and win in these new markets, 
OEMs will have to adopt new business models 
that enable them to strengthen their existing 
capabilities, accommodate new ones, and 
leverage each group with the other. 
Five business model options present 
themselves, each of which could deliver a 
profitability boost, depending on a player’s 
business strategy and how effectively they apply 
it (see Fig. 5).
Five major business models for the future
FIGURE 5
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5. Teaching Notes 
5.1 Overview  
This case study provides an overview of Daimler’s and BMW’s engagement in the sector of 
new mobility and how the companies’ mobility JV serves as a means of succeeding in this 
newly established sector. The first part provides the reader with the necessary background on 
the companies’ histories and underlines the financial struggles due to the prevalent problems in 
the automotive sector. The second part focuses on the market environment – namely the 
traditional automotive industry. First, it states the short and long-term challenges of the mobility 
market. Moreover, it analyzes the four main business models, which are of importance for the 
YourNow JV, based on their growth potential, target customers, and competitive environment. 
The third part describes the development and significance of the JV. It includes the preceded 
M&A strategies of both companies and presents the timeline of the JV, providing an assessment 
of the companies’ JV as of early 2020. Ultimately, positive and negative future scenarios for 
the JV’s development are presented.  
 
5.2 Teaching Objectives  
The case aims to be taught to university students in the field of management that are focusing 
on the areas of strategy, dynamic capabilities, organizational change, and disruptive 
technologies. Furthermore, the case can serve as an example of why to engage in strategic 
partnerships and how to bundle resources to stay competitive. It demonstrates how traditional 
manufacturing companies are facing external digital shocks, which force them to realign their 
existing resources. The case of the discussed companies might serve as an example for other 
historical first-movers that have to adapt their strategy to the newly developed challenges of the 
21st century. Having successfully worked through the presented case, readers should be able to:  
› Understand the concepts of DC and strategic partnerships  
› Gain an overall understanding of the struggles in a traditional manufacturing industry, 
based on financial and market data, as well as the opportunities and threats generated 
by technological disruption in the market 
› Analyze the strategic M&A choices of two leading companies and comprehend the 
motives promoting the creation of a strategic partnership 
› Evaluate the prospects of success of a strategic partnership, particularly with regard to 
realigning a company’s capabilities in line with future market developments  
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5.3 Intended Contribution  
This case aims to underline the challenges the two German car manufacturers, Daimler and 
BMW, were facing. It provides an overview of the new mobility market developments and the 
opportunities emerging for the automakers. Consequently, it contrasts the new digital business 
models with the traditional manufacturing business of the two companies. Besides establishing 
the industry setting, the case underlines the importance of strategic partnerships in the age of 
digital business models. It creates a timeline of the companies’ M&A activities as a means to 
enter the market and outlines the former opponents’ path to a strategic partnership. As a result, 
the case aims to provide the motives for the mobility JV and the opportunities created by it. At 
the same time it aims to critically examine the challenges the partnership has to face, given the 
already sophisticated global mobility markets. Therefore, it contributes to a better 
understanding of how strategic partnerships can be implemented. The case also illustrates, with 
a real-life example, the topic of DC and how important it is for firms to access them in order to 
respond to a highly dynamic environment.  
 
5.4 Pedagogical Overview 
In order to dive into the case and to analyze it from a strategic point of view, a fundamental 
knowledge of management, business processes, and technological trends is required. 
Additionally, the case as well as its theoretical concepts and corporate environment need to be 
prepared thoroughly before the classroom discussion.  
It is recommended for students and instructors to familiarize themselves with the concept of 
DC. Hereby, two theoretical foundations serve as guidelines: Dynamic Capabilities and 
Strategic Management by Teece et al. (1997) as well as Dynamic Capabilities: A Review of 
Past Research and an Agenda for the Future by Barreto (2010). The latter furthermore serves 
as a framework to successfully complete the assignment questions. Besides the concept of DC, 
it is recommended to understand the motives leading to strategic partnerships. Combinations of 
partners' joint venture formation motives by Klijn et al. (2010) creates a well-defined overview 
to understand the topic of JVs.  
Additionally, readers must get a general impression of the business setting as well as the two 
key players BMW and Daimler. In order to be able to classify the developments in the 
automotive industry, McKinsey’s industry outlook Automotive revolution – perspective 
towards 2030 as well as the report How automakers can master new mobility, summarize the 
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main trends and challenges faced by the automotive industry and provide solutions for new 
mobility concepts. Since the case focuses on the YourNow venture, it is recommended to visit 
the corporate website which serves as a good source to receive additional information. To get 
a more holistic view of the companies’ mobility strategies, readers are advised to peruse the 
websites of Daimler Mobility and the BMW Mobility Services. 
Overall, the instructor should be acquainted with the new mobility landscape and the 
automotive sector to successfully guide the classroom discussion and to spur new ideas.  
   
5.5 Assignment Questions & Analysis  
Question 1: What are the key drivers and the constraints on the demand for mobility services?  
 
 
Drivers of demand Constraints on the demand 
Changing consumer behavior  
Customers nowadays do not want to, or do 
not need to, own a car. Making use of 
mobility services allows them to lead a 
flexible lifestyle, adapting the mobility 
solution to their needs.  
Data privacy concerns  
Mobility services rely on GPS data, have 
access to consumers’ payment data and user 
behavior. Many customers are afraid of the 
technology behind the service and the lack of 
transparency thereof.  
New technological advancements  
New technological developments and 
internet access allows people around the 
world to connect with other users. These 
technological advancements decrease 
frictions and make it enormously easy to use 
mobility services. 
Immature business models  
It took Daimler and BMW months to launch 
their joint carsharing app. Once published, 
technological problems discouraged users. In 
North America the car-sharing model failed 
completely, due to the ill-fitting approach of 
the business model.  
Urbanization  
With increasing urbanization, traffic 
increases, parking spaces are hard to find and 
a ten-minute drive develops into a horror trip. 
Mobility services offer solutions that create a 
smooth travel experience.  
Government regulations  
Oftentimes city officials oppose new 
mobility services in order to protect certain 
lobbies. One example is the taxi lobby in 
Germany and Spain which prevents RH 









Question 2: After having read the case thoroughly, please name and describe three motives 
that lead Daimler and BMW to engage in their strategic partnership.  
1. Increasing market power  
The JV allowed both companies to achieve a better competitive position by leveraging a 
stronger market power. Given the combination of the horizontal JV, the merger of the branches 
allowed to extend the user base, creating a critical mass that puts them in a leader position. 
Resultantly, this market power can be used to further diversify and expand the companies’ 
services. One example of the increased market power is the creation of ShareNow through 
car2go and DriveNow. By combining two of the biggest players in the CS market, the merger 
to ShareNow allows to establish entry barriers through pricing power and a strong brand name. 
Furthermore, by combining the companies’ acquisitions, the JV covers various industries and 
geographical locations that create an extensive company network.  
 
Government regulations 
Increased CO2 taxes and off-limit city areas 
are making car-ownership increasingly 
unattractive. Many people are questioning 
the hassle of purchasing and owning a car, 
which drives them towards alternative 
solutions.  
Pricing 
Compared to public transportation, mobility 
services are high-priced, leading to 
consumers limiting their use to special 
occasions. A daily usage of mobility services, 
especially for long-term travel seems 
unaffordable for the majority of consumers.  
Government Incentives 
Besides limiting traditional car travel, 
governments incentivize the emergence of 
new mobility solutions in order to promote 
the creation of smart cities.  
Resistance to Change  
Especially the older generation (see 
“traditional” persona in Appendix 6) is 
oftentimes clinging to the status quo. Making 
them use technological and unfamiliar 




2. Combined (technological) knowledge 
Given the fast-paced market environment the companies find themselves in, new capabilities 
need to be developed quickly. A strategic partnership enables technology-driven companies to 
interlink their R&D efforts, which leads to faster and more innovative results. For example, 
whereas Daimler is more engaged in the field of ride-hailing and carsharing, BMW has more 
expertise in the field of parking and electronic charging. Combining this expertise allows both 
companies to create the future mobility provider. Additionally, new technology players are 
entering the market and can invest more money in research than the automotive companies, 
allowing them to create more innovative services. By combining their knowledge and R&D 
spendings the automakers aim to catch up or defend their position against technology 
companies by positioning themselves as an innovative force in the mobility field.  
 
3. Risk mitigation 
The outsourcing of the mobility branches as the new YourNow venture decreases risks as well 
as costs. Firstly, cost synergies appear due to the combination of the venture’s administration. 
Both previously standalone mobility branches are now combined into one, which decreases 
personnel costs. Secondly, economies of scale are created. This includes for example the 
maintenance of the shared cars or the development of apps for the various mobility solutions. 
Thirdly, both companies share the investment burden for the development of the venture, 
instead of trying to finance the mobility solutions themselves. With regard to risk, the 
companies are able to diversify it over two stock companies consisting of numerous 
subsidiaries. A weak performance in one market or one branch of the venture can be offset by 
another branch. And more holistically, a weak performance in the YourNow venture can be 





Question 3: Analyze the YourNow venture using the four dimensions of the Dynamic 
Capabilities framework by Barreto (2010).  
Examining each unique dimension, students are asked to evaluate how and to which extent the 
mobility venture was able to respond to exogenous shocks.  
 
  
Dimension 1: Ability so sense opportunities and threats  Rating: High  
Both companies sensed the potential threats that emerged through a decline in traditional car 
sales and technology companies entering the mobility market. They concluded that the 
investments needed to compete in the market would lead to a huge financial burden if the 
strategy was pursued independently.  
Daimler and BMW identified the opportunities of the new mobility market and its potential 
to offset the losses in the traditional segment. They inferred that by engaging in a strategic 
partnership their capabilities would be bundled, resulting in an increased market power and 
a stronger innovative capability. Both companies realized that they needed to overcome their 
business rivalry to create a sustainable competitive advantage.      
Dimension 2: Ability to make timely decisions  Rating: Medium 
Dimension 2: Ability to make timely decisions – Medium  
The first speculations about the venture started in 2017 and intensified in May 2017, with the 
plan to launch the JV late 2017. Nevertheless, it took until February 2019 for the venture to 
be officially launched, due to ongoing and slow negotiations. Even though both companies 
had been investing heavily in various mobility startups since 2011, the overall urge to engage 
in a strategic partnership lagged behind. Consequently, the delay of the decisions to build a 







Dimension 3: Ability to make market-oriented decisions Rating: High  
Both BMW and Daimler have identified the key drivers of the new mobility market through 
their R&D team. As a result, they engaged heavily in respective market players through 
M&A activities as well as partnerships. Those investments covered areas such as shared 
mobility, electromobility, and autonomous vehicles. Additionally, future-oriented 
investments in 3D printing, virtual reality, or cybersecurity underline the companies’ 
intentions to seize emerging markets as well. Besides external investments the companies 
furthermore developed internal solutions through their in-house mobility research facilities, 
resulting, for example, in ParkNow or car2go. With regard to the JV, the market-orientation 
of the companies’ decisions can be exemplified by its CS strategy: Identifying potential 
geographical markets, testing them by launching the CS operations, and closing the market 
if CS proves to be unprofitable.   
Dimension 4: Ability to make market-oriented decisions Rating: High 
The companies engaged in the JV to accelerate the transformation of their resource base from 
traditional manufacturing to service provision. This goes in line with the realignment of their 
strategies, which aim at diversifying their portfolio in order to become a “full mobility 
provider”. The companies have gained new resources through their extensive M&A 
activities. They released resources when they got rid of unprofitable acquisitions, such as 
Chrysler, and have also realigned their business, for example through the outsourcing of the 
mobility unit. This future-oriented strategy can ultimately create spillover effects for the 




Question 4: Do you think the JV between BMW and Daimler equips the automakers to succeed 
in the new mobility market?  
After knowing which group you belong to, prepare your arguments and facts for the debate 
keeping in mind the DC framework and the motives collected earlier. Engage in an open 
classroom discussion.   
Group 1: Representatives of Daimler and BMW that are now employed in the YourNow venture. 
Group 2: Representatives of new tech players such as Google and Uber.  
After carefully evaluating the case and the theoretical background, students will be divided into 
two groups by the instructor and are asked to prepare their arguments before the lecture. They 
will be asked to engage in a discussion led by the instructor. In an alternating debate, students 
are asked to present their arguments and reasoning behind them. The instructor is responsible 
for tracking the speaking time, recording the arguments and ultimately summarizing the 
findings of both groups. 





“The JV equips Daimler and BMW to 
succeed in the new mobility market.” 
CONTRA 
“The JV does not equip the automakers to 
succeed in the new mobility market.” 
Expertise  
Both companies have a centuries-old 
business experience in the mobility field. 
Using this experience and having learned 
from mistakes allows them to enter or create 
new mobility markets.  
Slow-moving corporate structure  
Both companies are enormous and have been 
established for a long time. This structure 
decelerates processes and impedes 
innovativeness.  
Large customer base and brand name  
Both brands are well-known and have sold 
millions of cars to customers. Those loyal 
customers can be transferred to the new 
mobility solutions, linking the traditional and 
emerging business. 
Loss of historical brand equity  
Young people do not associate historical 
brand names with technology or innovation. 
They would rather support young tech firms 










Joint capabilities  
The JV enables BMW and Daimler to 
complement their existing services, which 
allows the companies to create a far-reaching 
network that encompasses various services 
and markets. This helps to achieve a critical 
mass as well as profitability faster.  
From rivals to partners? 
Even though Daimler and BMW use the JV 
to underline their forward-thinking strategy, 
profit maximization for their shareholders 
remains the priority. This being said, the 
conversion of rivals into “start-up“-like 
partners requires effort and can quickly lead 
to power struggles.  
Expanding their head start 
Daimler and BMW have been pioneering in 
CS (car2go and DriveNow) as well as RH 
(MyTaxi). They have been dominating 
several new mobility markets and industries 
before new technology players entered. 
Combining their strengths allows them to 
defend this first-mover advantage more 
rigorously.  
Even combined not innovative enough 
Despite the JV and the merging of 
capabilities, the venture will not be as 
innovative as the technology players. Uber’s 
and Google’s whole business model breathes 
innovation. This deeply embedded focus on 
the next big thing and hyper-growth cannot 
be “learned” by simply creating an 
outsourced JV.   
Shareholder interests  
Since both BMW and Daimler are joint-stock 
companies they pursue the interests of their 
shareholders. Furthermore, they rely on them 
for external financing. Engaging in the 
mobility JV sent a strong message to their 
shareholders, which back the venture with 
their financial support.  
Financial freedom  
Shareholder promises and tight financial 
responsibilities are an alien concept for 
technology companies. For them, growth is 
more important than profitability, the former 
oftentimes heavily backed by venture 
capitalists. This financial freedom allows 












Case analysis and discussion 20 minutes 
Question 1 15 minutes 
Question 2 10 minutes 
Question 3 15 minutes 
Question 4  20 minutes 




6. Discussion  
The DC theory has influenced the field of strategic management tremendously since its first 
publication in 1997 by Teece et al. Since then, a variety of scholars has further elaborated the 
framework, illuminating it from diverse perspectives. Barreto’s (2010) transformation of the 
theoretical concept into an “aggregate multidimensional construct” allows the DC framework 
to be applied to real-world business cases, allowing decision-makers to grade and potentially 
realign the company’s strategic focus. The underlying case, which covers the emergence of 
Daimler’s and BMW’s mobility JV YourNow, serves as such a practical example. The case 
combines the strategic challenges traditional manufacturing companies are facing, in a world 
that is continuously exposed to technological disruptions and changing consumer behavior. It 
underlines the importance of a company’s existing resource base and its potential to change this 
base in a timely manner in accordance with market developments. Besides an in-depth analysis 
of the DC framework, it examines the occurrence of strategic partnerships, especially the 
motives leading to the creation of a JV.  
Daimler and BMW have been chosen for the underlying case due to their decade-long history 
in the automotive sector. The initial rivals have been undisputed leaders in this sector up until 
recently when exogenous shocks in the form of decreasing demand and increasing competition 
from new technological entrants jeopardized their position. Concurrently, the companies’ 
resource base was challenged, raising the question of whether a quick transformation into the 
mobility sector was feasible. The case analysis in light of Barreto’s (2010) four-dimensional 
DC framework attempts to answer this question.  
Not merely the possession of capabilities but intuitively sensing external changes creates the 
base for a competitive advantage (Barreto, 2010; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Daimler and 
BMW took notice of the declining traditional car sales market. Consequently, they engaged in 
a JV in order to access the new mobility market.  
As underlined by Barney & Wright (2001) and Wang & Ahmed (2007) the DC theory lies at 
the heart of the fast-moving market, such as the mobility market. Consequently, reacting to 
exogenous shocks in a timely manner is a prerequisite to achieve a sustainable competitive 
advantage. Although the companies’ internal mobility developments and external mobility 
acquisitions started already in 2011, the decision to engage in a JV took until 2019. With many 
technological competitors already having entered the field with sophisticated mobility business 
models, this delay might have prevented Daimler and BMW from gaining the upper hand as 
the leading mobility provider.  
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Additionally, the ability to make market-oriented decisions is highlighted. Teece (2007) states 
that this applies primarily to markets that are underdeveloped and subject to technological 
change. The mobility market is relatively well-developed in terms of geographical coverage, 
technological advancement, and customer acceptance. However, while the market cannot be 
categorized as underdeveloped it is certainly influenced by technological change. Technology 
is at the core of all new mobility concepts, for example, in the form of apps, data processing, 
or GPS functions. Rapid technological developments have led to and are consistently 
transforming the mobility market, which requires high innovativeness and huge investments 
from firms.  
Lastly, the DC framework incorporates the company’s ability to change its resource base. This 
is dependent on the company’s current, primarily intangible assets as well as the path 
dependencies stemming from them (Teece, 1997). Realigning the company’s resource base can 
be achieved through gaining, releasing, or reconfiguring resources (Barreto, 2010). As shown 
in Appendix 7, Daimler and BMW have been heavily engaged in M&A activities, strengthening 
their position in the mobility market. However, they also decided to sell some of the acquired 
companies that did not show to be competitive, such as Chrysler or Range Rover. Additionally, 
they were able to reconfigure their resources, for example by internally creating new mobility 
business models that were outsourced in a separate mobility division. Eisenhardt & Martin 
(2000) and Barreto (2010) challenge the concept of path dependencies presented by Teece 
(1997), stating that companies can possess similar DC. This plays an important part in this case, 
due to BMW’s and Daimler’s direct competition in the automotive sector as well as in the new 
mobility sector (for example DriveNow vs. car2go).  
The objective of DC is to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage. An “indirect link” 
(Barreto, 2010) connects a firm’s capabilities with its profit, due to its ongoing realignment 
with the market’s requirements. As of 2020 the JV’s numbers look promising, however, the 
majority of the mobility branches is not yet profitable. Compared to the existing capabilities in 
the manufacturing and sales business, the new mobility branch plays a minor role in terms of 
profit generation. Nevertheless, taking into account the long-winded timeline of the JV, its 
capacity to transform into a profitable branch of the automakers might require some additional 
time and financial investment.  
Just like the majority of JVs, allowing for autonomy of both partners, the YourNow venture is 
organized in a 50-50 ownership split as a balanced horizontal JV (Moskalev & Swensen, 2007; 
Lou 2002). As stated by Harrigan (1988), JVs are largely used in mature markets to increase 
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competitiveness and to expand the companies’ businesses. However, as demonstrated by the 
underlying case, JVs also serve as a means to create new markets and to diversify the existing 
portfolio.   
Given their dynamic market environment, especially the technology industry calls for strategic 
alliances, due to the opportunity to combine and transfer technological know-how (Vilkamo & 
Keil, 2003; Wahab, 2010). Entering the new mobility market, the manufacturers find 
themselves in such an innovative industry where technology players are disrupting common 
business models. To combine R&D resources, the JV allows both companies to supplement 
their existing resources in the mobility sector, which ultimately spurs the development of new 
capabilities (Brouthers et al., 2008). By combining their resources both companies were able to 
invest around €1.13bn into the mobility venture. Uniting the acquired technology companies in 
their respective portfolio additionally allows them to create a broad knowledge network 
spanning across various industries. Ultimately, the JV enables Daimler and BMW to leverage 
their joint experience in the traditional automotive sector while increasing their innovativeness 
through a broad diversification into new mobility markets.  
Besides the technological knowhow, Daimler and BMW are using their JV to reduce risk, one 
of the main motives to engage in a strategic partnership (Klijn et al., 2010). The investment 
burden to succeed in the new mobility market is estimated at $70bn for an individual company 
(Möller et al., 2019). Given the companies’ recent declines in profits from their vehicle sales, 
such investments carry a huge risk, especially given the companies’ status as stock companies. 
Consequently, the JV allows them to spread the risk across various markets, products, and 
subsidiaries. This allows the carmakers to test mobility solutions as well as locations without 
coevally risking to lose too much money. Besides the mitigation of risk, engaging in a JV also 
creates cost synergies and operational synergies, for horizontal JVs and JVs of similar 
companies respectively (Johnson & Houston, 2000; Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992). Even though 
YourNow can be categorized as a horizontal JV and Daimler and BMW are similar companies, 
the case is not able to prove that the above-mentioned synergies exist. Even though both 
companies have merged their mobility companies, they announced the emergence of 1,000 
additional jobs, increasing the overall workforce and, hence, personnel costs.  
Overall, by engaging in JVs, companies are able to increase their competitive market power 
(Klijn et al., 2010). This is true for segments where Daimler and BMW have been competing 
simultaneously, such as the carsharing market. In cities where DriveNow and car2go have both 
been operating, the transformation into ShareNow has created enormous entry barriers for 
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competitors and operational economies of scale. Furthermore, through strategic partnerships, 
companies are able to enter new geographical markets (Gomes-Casseres, 1989). In the case of 
the YourNow venture this does not seem to be the primary motive for the JV. Just after having 
launched the JV, the companies announced their withdrawal from the North American market. 
However, on a more partial note, the companies’ individual M&A activities into diverse startup 
companies might serve as a means to expand internationally. 
In summary, almost 70% of JVs fail (Kogut, 1991), hence, there is a huge risk that the 2019 
established JV between Daimler and BMW might not work out. Even though the “task-related 
criteria” which encompass the companies’ capabilities look good on paper, the intangible 
“partner-related criteria” such as strategic fit, objectives, and commitment are more difficult 
to assess (Das & He, 2006). Both companies are under tremendous pressure to make the JV 
work and have already experienced major setbacks such as the US exit or the delay in 
establishing the JV in the first place. The financial burden of funding the unprofitable mobility 
segment, while concurrently needing to respond to other megatrends, such as electronic 
vehicles and autonomous driving, creates a lot of conflict potential for the two carmakers. 
Consequently, it remains to be seen whether the motives that lead to the JV will pay off in the 
near future.  
Overall, the case of Daimler’s and BMW’s mobility venture can serve as an example for 
traditional manufacturing industry players that are confronted with external technological 
shocks which oblige them to rethink their strategic orientation. It highlights the obstacles that 
industrial companies are facing and how they are able to circumvent them through the power 
of cooperation. However, not without considering the constant effort needed to successfully 
lead a strategic partnership.   
Certain limitations have to be considered when analyzing the case, as well as its managerial 
implications. First of all, the case only covers two companies and their strategy to respond to 
exogenous shocks. Hence, the scope of the examination is limited and additional research for 
other industries and companies is required. Furthermore, the companies have particularly been 
examined from the perspective of the strategic partnership. Consequently, a more holistic view, 
including other strategic processes and a more comprehensive timeframe might be necessary to 
draw in-depth future predictions. Thirdly, the application of the DC theory is merely a 
qualitative one and, thus, might be biased (Winter, 2003). A more quantitative approach of the 
DC framework would be needed in order to prove a linkage between a company's strategic 
capabilities and the creation of a sustainable competitive advantage. Lastly, it would be 
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interesting to research the correlation between DC and strategic partnerships, and how 
supplementing capabilities through mergers or partnerships influence a firm’s success, 







7. Conclusion  
Technological disruptions have shaped the 21st century and constitute one of the biggest 
challenges faced by industrial enterprises. Even though those disruptions made life easier for 
millions of consumers, they diminished the resource base of established market leaders. The 
automotive industry is one of the sectors that is heavily influenced by technological 
advancements and, hence, is required to react to exogenous shocks by having its players adjust 
their individual capabilities. In order to exemplify the realignment of automotive companies 
towards new mobility solutions, Daimler’s and BMW’s journey towards their joint mobility 
venture YourNow has been thoroughly examined in the form of a case study. Hereby, the 
concept of DC served as a framework to analyze the timeline and underlying resources of the 
JV from a managerial perspective. Combining the theoretical concept with the real-world case 
paved the way for a deeper understanding of the firms’ industry setting as well as their strategic 
orientations in terms of new mobility developments. Complementary, by examining the 
motives for the venture, the significance of strategic partnerships in fast-moving and 
investment-intensive environments was highlighted.  
Taking Barretos’s four dimensions of the DC framework into account, it becomes clear that 
Daimler and BMW have reacted in accordance with market developments. The industry is 
moving away from traditional car sales into more flexible mobility solutions. By introducing 
the five (and later three) pillars of the YourNow venture, the companies are well-positioned – 
or as Harald Krüger, the former BMW CEO put it: “can combine their strengths and become a 
champion.” The firms’ merger created a chance for both carmakers to remain competitive by 
bundling their expertise, finances, and visions. Nevertheless, time is ticking and the competition 
has never been as innovative and venture-backed as today. The YourNow venture is still in its 
infancy and the pressure to succeed is high, with both companies wanting to achieve 
profitability. Hence, it remains to be seen whether BMW’s and Daimler’s mobility cooperation 
proves itself to be a “champion”.  
In conclusion, this thesis provided the opportunity to take a deep dive into the automotive 
industry and the challenges it is exposed to. By working through one of the most significant 
strategic frameworks, namely DC, it was possible to investigate the case of the YourNow 
venture from various managerial angles. This certainly underlined the significance of long-term 
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